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Introduction 
It has been argued that bureaucratic structures have important effects on political, 
economic, and social outcomes. Scholars in economics and sociology argue that a strong 
and well-organized bureaucracy contributed to the economic growth in the Asian miracle 
economies of the 1990s as well as to the economic growth more generally in semi-
industrial countries (Amsden 1989; Evans and Rauch 1999; Wade 1990; World bank 
1993). Other scholars claim that the way the state bureaucracy is organized also 
strengthens poverty reduction in developing countries (Henderson et al 2007). With 
reference to the rich western democracies, political scientists have long argued that the 
bureaucratic structure directly affects policymaking, both historically and today 
(Dahlström 2009; Heclo 1974; King and Rothstein 1993; Marier 2005; Weir and Skocpol 
1985). Within the field of public administration, scholars have defended the bureaucratic 
organization, warned against the effects of New Public Management reforms and are now 
predicting the “rediscovery” of bureaucracy (Olsen 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; 
Suleiman 2003). 
 
However, in spite of the attention paid to bureaucratic structures there are very few large 
cross-country comparisons where the organization of the state bureaucracy is actually 
incorporated. There are several reasons for this. First, the “sore point in the development 
of comparative public administration” is the lack of reliable data on bureaucratic 
structures (Brans 2003, 426; see also Lapuente 2007, 301). There are numerous cross-
country indicators on the outcomes of bureaucracies, both from private organizations – 
such as the widely used Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide 
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indicator of “quality of bureaucracy” – and from public ones – such as the encompassing 
World Bank’s “governance indicators”. Yet there is an almost no cross-country datasets 
on bureaucratic structure. The sole exception is Peter Evans and James Rauch’s 
pioneering work. Their innovative study resulted in several influential articles and a 
dataset that has extensively been used in several cross-country comparisons (see for 
example Evans and Rauch 1999; Rauch and Evans 2000; Henderson et al 2007; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder 2001). Evans and Rauch dataset has however some limits since it 
only covers 35 developing or “semi-industrialized” countries and focuses on the 1970-
1990 period. While it provides pioneering insights into the bureaucratic structures of a 
particular group of countries which experienced unprecedented growth rates with the help 
of autonomous bureaucracies (such as Spain, South Korea and other Asian “Tigers”), it 
remains unclear if the same results holds for other parts of the World. 
 
A second reason for why we do not see more cross-country comparisons of state 
bureaucratic structures is that it is not entirely clear what should be compared. Evans and 
Rauch address – and find support for – what they call the “Weberian state hypothesis”. 
This hypothesis refers to the effect of several different Weberian organizational features 
(such as meritocratic recruitment to the state bureaucracy, predictable careers for 
bureaucrats, etc.) on economic growth and bureaucratic performance. However in a 
recent article, Johan P. Olsen points out that one of the main lessons from the “ups and 
downs of bureaucratic organization” is that the composite nature of bureaucratic 
organizations makes it probable that the different bureaucratic dimensions change in 
different ways and “is not always positively correlated” (Olsen 2008, 13, 25). Olsen’s 
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note reminds us of that even if we limit the analysis to the Weberian features of the 
bureaucracy it might very well be multidimensional.  
 
This chapter addresses these two obstacles for cross-country comparisons of the state 
bureaucratic structure. First, we present the Quality of Government Institute’s “Quality of 
Government Survey”, a dataset on the structure and behavior of public administration 
based on an expert poll in 97 countries. It uses the conceptual basis of Evans and Rauch’s 
data on Weberian bureaucracies as a theoretical tool for guiding data collection, but other 
perspectives such as New Public Management and administrative “impartiality” has also 
informed the questionnaire design (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Rothstein and Teorell 
2008). The goal is to identify important structural characteristics that differentiate public 
administrations. Second, the chapter suggests two dimensions of the bureaucratic 
structure, labeled bureaucratic “professionalism” and “closedness”, which correspond 
with established classifications in the comparative administrative history (see for example 
Silberman 1993 or Lægreid and Recascino Wise 2007).1 Interestingly, however, the 
“closedness” dimension only appears in parts of our sample, namely developed Western 
democracies and the post-communist countries, not in developing countries in Latin 
America, Asia or Africa. The “professionalism” dimension, by contrast, comes through 
as a more universal feature of bureaucracies. 
 
In the remainder of the chapter we first provide the theoretical justification for focusing 
our analysis on the human relations features of public bureaucracies. Second, we describe 
the sampling frame, data collection and questionnaire design in some detail. Third, we 
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analyze the multidimensionality of the bureaucratic structure and propose the two 
bureaucratic dimensions mentioned above as a way of classifying public administrations. 
Finally, we validate the cross-country patterns against other available sources, including 
broad cross-country datasets, few case comparisons and more in-depth case studies, and 
assess the extent to which respondent characteristics predict placement of countries along 
these dimensions. In the concluding section we discuss the implications of our study. 
 
Key characteristics of bureaucratic structures 
When it comes to measuring and classifying public bureaucracies, there are broadly 
speaking two strands in the literature. On the one hand economists, who are mostly 
focused on the “quality” of the outcomes produced by a given state apparatus (see for 
example the World Bank’s Governance Database). On the other hand comparative public 
administration scholars have developed broad typologies based on theoretical concepts 
such as administrative legacies or civil service traditions (Barzelay and Galleo 2010; 
Painter and Peters 2010).  
 
The subject for this chapter is however somewhat different, and the important question is 
which the key characteristics of bureaucratic structures are. Following Evans and Rauch 
(1999), our answer is that the employment system in the public sector offers a useful way 
of classifying public bureaucracies in comparative public administration. There are 
several reasons for this. 
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First, while employment relationships are at the theoretical core of the concept of 
Weberian bureaucracy, they have been empirically overlooked. In his pivotal essays 
published in the volume Economy and Society (1978), Max Weber gave an 
overwhelming importance to public staff policy. The interactions between rulers and their 
administrative were essential to understand a society (Keiser and Baer 2005). Weber saw 
an unavoidable organizational conflict within modern bureaucracies: “Historical reality 
involves a continuous, though for the most part latent, conflict between chiefs and their 
administrative staffs for appropriation and expropriation in relation to one another” 
(Weber 1978, 264). Personnel policy is the tool for managing that “latent” but key 
bureaucratic conflict and therefore we consider it to be a preferential object of study.   
 
Second, scholars have pointed out important variations in how public employment is 
managed. In some public administrations, politicians are totally free to choose their 
public employees. In others, administrations have stringent civil service regulations or 
autonomous administrative corps that constrains the selection. These employment 
systems represent “the most striking” difference between public and private organizations 
(Frant 1993, 990; Lapuente 2007, 1).  
 
These reasons are also the motivation behind Evans and Rauch’s (1999) data collection 
effort. Following Weber’s insight that the key for achieving good governance is replacing 
a patronage bureaucracy with a merit bureaucracy, Evans and Rauch (1999) develop the 
“Weberian state hypothesis”. Their data collection is guided by the idea that there is an 
underlying continuum between, on one extreme, patrimonial bureaucracy and, on the 
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other, Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy. In line with this, they build an indicator – called 
“Weberianness Scale” – and show how developing countries scoring higher on it were 
growing faster in the 1970-1990 period. The “Weberianess Scale”, which collapses 
information on ten items, captures the degree to which bureaucracies employ meritocratic 
recruitment and give predictable, stable and rewarding long-term careers to civil servants.  
 
Despite the strength of their findings, we wish to highlight an intriguing puzzle that is not 
captured by Evans and Rauch (1999). As pointed out of by administrative scholars and 
historians bureaucracies are not one-dimensional. Based on studies of Civil service 
systems in Europe scholars have observed several dimensions that not necessarily is 
positively correlated.  
 
If there was only one dimension capturing the Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy, one 
should expect bureaucracies more similar to the private sector (flexible and with few 
constrains to hire and fire) to be less meritocratic, and more patrimonial than 
bureaucracies where public employees enter the civil service via a formal examination 
system and enjoy special protections against arbitrary actions by their (political) 
superiors. However, in practice, the advancement of meritocracy does not necessarily go 
hand in hand with a higher protection of employment in the public sector (Olson 2008).  
 
There are examples from Early Modern Europe suggesting that there are at least two 
dimensions capturing the how the bureaucracy works. Britain and France represent two 
opposite models on how to achieve a meritocratic public workforce. In its state-building 
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process, Britain did not develop an autonomous civil service. The non-formalized system 
of hiring and firing in the Early Modern Britain was more private-sector-like. As Fischer 
and Lundgreen (1975, 483) point out Britain lacked, comparatively speaking, legal 
regulations for public employment and “no merit system was formally established, but 
this does not mean that merit remained necessarily unrewarded”. Britain created a system 
of “hunting” and protection of talent, which “remained in a much more fluid, adaptable 
state than on the Continent”. On the contrary, in France, Prussia and Spain the 
transformation from a patrimonial to a meritocratic bureaucracy entailed the development 
of highly legalistic civil service systems. Public employees were covered by extensive 
special regulations and grouped into autonomous and self-regulated administrative 
bodies, generally known as Corps. These bodies established formalized merit-based 
examinations to recruit new members, which were hardly disrupted by governmental or 
royal arbitrary intervention, and they also monopolized the management of civil servants’ 
incentives and disciplinary measures (see also Finer 1997). It thus seems like Britain was 
able to develop a professional bureaucracy, without also introducing a closed recruitment 
system. This indicates that the professionalism and the closedness of the bureaucracy 
should be measured separately. 
 
The historical differences discussed above were still present at the moment of expansion 
of state activities in Western countries during the late 19th century. In an analysis of the 
evolution of bureaucratic structures at that time, Silberman (1993) finds that in countries 
like the US, the UK, Canada or Switzerland public bureaucracies developed a 
‘professional orientation’, since public employees, like the private-sector employees, 
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were recruited to fill in a given job. In the section “Dimensions of bureaucracy in the real 
World” we will discuss our empirical indicators of this professionalism dimension.  
 
A second dimension has been described by several authors. Building on experiences from 
civil service systems in Europe, they point out that there is a division between “open” 
(e.g. UK, Denmark, and Netherlands) and “closed” systems (e.g. France, German, Spain). 
In the closed system, public employees join the administration through formalized civil 
service entry examinations, enjoy life tenure and are frequently managed by self-
regulated autonomous administrative corps. At the other end of the continuum we have 
the more “open” civil service systems, where most public employees are regulated by 
general labour laws like their private-sector counterparts and selected according to the 
rule of “best-suited candidate for each position”, instead of generally joining an 
administrative body (Auer, Demmke and Poltet 1996; Bekke and van der Meer 2000; 
Heady 1996; OECD 2004). Also this dimension will be further discussed and evaluated 
in the empirical section. 
 
In sum, scholarly studies point towards the existence and importance of the employment 
system as a key characteristic for defining public bureaucracies. We have also explained 
why we expect at least two dimensions – referred to as professionalism and closedness – 
to occur in the data. We should, however, already at this point note that these two 
dimensions are developed mainly based on a European experience, while we are testing 
them on a Global sample of countries. In the next section we will describe the data 
collection and then turn to the empirical analysis of these dimensions.  
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Questionnaire design 
The general purpose of the “Quality of Government” survey is to measure the structure 
and behavior of public administration across countries. The exact wording of the items 
analyzed in this chapter is provided in Appendix A. For the full questionnaire and more 
details see Dahlberg et al. (2011), and the data generated by the survey is available at the 
Quality of Government Institute web page (www.qog.pol.gu.se). 
 
Despite being condense, the questionnaire covers a variety of topics which are seen as 
relevant to the structure and functioning of the public administration according to the 
literature, but on which we lack quantitative indicators for a large number of countries, 
such as meritocratic recruitment, internal promotion and career stability, salaries, 
impartiality, NPM reforms, effectiveness/efficiency, and bureaucratic representation.  
 
Two considerations motivating the questionnaire design deserve special mentioning. 
First, the questionnaire asks about perceptions rather than about statements of facts. In 
this regard, it differs from Evans and Rauch (1999; Rauch and Evans 2000) and is more 
in line with the general surge in expert polls on quality of government across the globe. 
Thus, for example, whereas Rauch and Evans (2000, 56) ask their respondents to state 
“approximately what proportion of the higher officials…enter the civil service via a 
formal examination system”, with responses coded in percentages, we instead ask: 
“Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following 
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occurs today: Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system”, with 
responses ranging from 1 (“hardly ever”) to 7 (“almost always”). 
 
The downside of this strategy is that the subjectively defined endpoints might introduce 
bias in the country-level estimates, particularly if experts have varying standards of what 
should be considered “common” or “uncommon”. The reason we still opted for this 
strategy is twofold. 
 
First, this enables us to use the same response scale for a large number of “factual” 
questions, rather than having to tailor the response categories uniquely for each 
individual item in the questionnaire. The overarching rationale here is thus questionnaire 
efficiency: we save both space and response time by a more standardized question 
format. 
 
Second, we believe that even the most knowledgeable country experts are rarely in a 
position to correctly answer more than a handful of these questions with any precision. In 
other words, even the factual question format used by Evans and Rauch (1999) evokes 
informed guesswork on behalf of the experts. The questionnaire makes this guesswork 
more explicit from the outset by asking about overall perceptions rather than “correct” 
answers. 
 
The difference between these two question formats should not be exaggerated. At the end 
of the day, most of the questions have a factual basis in the sense that some answers for a 
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given country are more correct than others. We are not primarily interested in perceptions 
per se, but in the reality that underlies these perceptions. As indicated by the assessments 
of respondent perception bias reported below, there are few instances where personal 
characteristics of the experts systematically predict how they place their respective 
countries. In other words, subjectively defined endpoints do not appear to be a serious 
threat to the validity of these measures. 
 
Moreover, by relying on more than one expert per country, the cross-country descriptive 
reported below rely on the convergence of different expert perceptions as our point 
estimate for the actual workings of a certain country. In practice, this means relying on 
the mean estimate per country. These cross-country means are overall well correlated 
with other data sources representing the most established – although small-N – proxies 
for types of bureaucratic structure up to date. As the section on cross-source validation 
indicates, there is no obvious support for the presence of systematic measurement error in 
our data. As a matter of fact, it is quite the opposite, the data presented here seems to 
generalize for a larger and more diverse group of countries some smaller-N studies and 
insights by administrative historians. At the same time, respondent disagreement within 
countries (i.e. the variation around the country mean) may be used as an indication of the 
uncertainty surrounding each country estimate, thus providing a gauge of the extent of 
random measurement error.  
 
The second design issue concerns how to label and select the dramatis personae at center 
stage of the inquiry. More precisely, should one ask about the public administration in 
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general or about specific sectors or agencies? The survey could have been focused on a 
“core agency” in the public administration, as did Evans and Rauch (1999), but it is 
challenging to define what should be considered the “core” of a state. Recall that Evans 
and Rauch (1999) had a particular bureaucratic outcome in mind when designing their 
study: that of attaining economic development. Our approach is more general. Apart from 
studying outcomes such as growth or economic well-being, the survey is designed to 
explore consequences for public opinion such as generalized trust and subjective well-
being. For these types of outcomes the characteristics of street-level bureaucrats could be 
as important as the those of senior officials, and what specific sector or agency within the 
public administration that should matter the most cannot be easily settled in advance (and 
might very well vary between countries). Thus, we opted for a holistic take on the public 
administration, trying to gauge perceptions of its working in general (with one major 
exception: we explicitly exclude the military). 
 
After pre-testing it in a pilot, the term chosen to designate – at the most general level – 
those persons within the public administration we inquire into was public sector 
employee. This is of course a debatable solution. Most notably, there might be large 
variation across different types of public sector employees in a country, and the expert 
respondents might then run into difficulties when asked to provide one overall judgment. 
To off-set this problem somewhat, the survey contained the following clarification in the 
opening page of the questionnaire: 
 
When asking about public sector employees in this survey, we would like you to think about a typical 
person employed by the public sector in your country, excluding the military. If you think there are 
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large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and 
subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service 
delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response. 
 
This is of course more easily said than done, as is also indicated by the numerous 
comments on this particular issue provided by the respondents. By exploring the 
consistency and face validity of the data below, however, we may conclude that this 
strategy worked more often than not. 
 
Sampling frame and data collection 
After a pilot conducted in the winter of 2007-2008, the survey has been administrated in 
two waves, the first between September 2008 and May 2009, the second between March 
and November 2010 (for details, see Dahlberg et al. 2011). In order to obtain a sample of 
experts, we drew up a list of persons registered with international networks for public 
administration scholars (such as NISPACEE, EGPA, EIPA, SOG, CLAD, ICAP, ISEAS 
and CAPAM), complemented with searches on the internet, personal contacts, the list of 
experts recruited from a pilot survey, and a small snowballing component. All in all, this 
resulted in a sample of 1361 persons in the first wave, of which 528 or 39 percent 
responded, and 1414 in the second, of which 432 or 31 percent responded.2 Adding to 
this 13 persons who responded to an open link distributed to one network of scholars 
(where we thus cannot track the number of potential respondents), this sums to 973 
experts having provided responses for 126 countries (including 2 semi-sovereign 
territories: Hong Kong and Puerto Rico). 
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The distribution of experts across countries is provided in Table 1. While the number of 
respondents varies substantially, from only 1 for some countries to a maximum of 28 in 
the Czech Republic, on average 7.7 experts per country have taken the time to respond to 
our survey. The countries covered more or less span the globe, including Western Europe 
and North America, the post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, Latin America, Asia and even the Middle East. Two notable omissions in 
terms of geographical representation stand out: one concerns Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
other island states in the Pacific and Caribbean. Although some of the poorest countries 
of the world are thus not included, our sample thus still covers a substantial part of both 
the developed and developing world. 
 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
 
Dimensions of bureaucracy in the real World 
We now turn to the key result of this web survey. To enhance data quality, this section’s 
analysis exclusively relies on the 936 respondents covering 97 countries for which at 
least 3 expert responses have been obtained. Given the impossibility to account for all 
bureaucratic features in a comparative study, we concentrate on what could be referred to 
as the human resources dimension(s) of a Weberian bureaucracy, leaving other 
characteristics aside. With the human resources dimension(s) we basically mean the 
recruitment, the career, and the rewarding system for public employees. It is important to 
emphasize here that, as Olsen (2008) notes; there are several other characteristics of an 
ideal type Weberian bureaucracy such as the bureau organization, the hierarchical 
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organization, and the rule-based authority. Nevertheless, following the theoretical reasons 
presented in previous sections and the empirical recommendation by Evans and Rauch, 
we consider staff policy or human resources to have an essential role for explaining 
bureaucratic capacity (Evans and Rauch 1999; Olsen 2008).  
 
For the present purposes we have explored the eight items that, for the literature reviewed 
above, represent the main employment-related characteristics of a Weberian bureaucracy. 
According to the most prevailing view (confirmed in Evans and Rauch’s 1999 dataset) 
one should expect these characteristics to go hand in hand. These items include the extent 
to which recruitment is based on merit (q2_a) and formal examinations (q2_c) rather than 
political criteria (q2_b, q2_d), as well as the extent to which promotion within the 
hierarchy is an internal affair (q2_e) and is based on lifelong career paths (q2_f). 
Competitive salaries (q2_k) and special protection from extraordinary labor laws (q8_1) 
are other components of this assemblage of features. (For an extract of the survey 
questionnaire including the items just discussed see Appendix A.) 
 
These questions are capturing different bureaucratic characteristics, and could be seen as 
indicators of distinct bureaucratic dimensions. Table 2 reports the results from country-
level principal components factor analyses of the above mentioned eight items. The goal 
is thus to ascertain whether a set of underlying dimensions structure the differences in 
mean responses across countries. 
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As reported in the first panel (A) of Table 2, based on all 97 countries, meritocratic 
recruitment and internal promotion appear to be strongly connected in a first dimension 
with a non-politicized bureaucracy. Since these characteristics represent the ideal of a 
“professional” (vis-à-vis “politicized”) administration, and mentioned earlier in the 
chapter we call this dimension bureaucratic “professionalism”. 
 
Nevertheless, not all “Weberian” characteristics seem to go hand in hand. Specifically, 
some features form a second empirically significant cluster. In this second dimension, the 
use of formal examination systems is intimately connected to having lifelong careers and 
protection through special employment regulations. Since this dimension captures the 
distinction between open (i.e. more “private-like”) and closed (i.e. more “public-like”) 
civil service systems mentioned above, we call it bureaucratic “closedness”. 
 
Thus, contrary to the intuitive view that a more public-oriented or “closed” 
administration would prevent politicization and enhance meritocracy, the analysis in 
Table 2 shows that the countries with more closed bureaucracies do not significantly have 
more meritocratic recruitment or less politicization of the civil service. The final 
component, competitive salaries, does not conclusively belong to either of these 
dimensions and should therefore be treated separately. 
 
*** Table 2 around here *** 
 
 17 
However, upon closer scrutiny it turns out that this dimensional structure is not 
universally applicable. Based on more fine-grained dimensional analyses performed 
region-by-region,3 the details of which we omit for space-preserving reasons, the global 
pattern seems to hold up fairly well in the 47 countries drawing from the “West” 
(meaning Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand) and the “East” 
(meaning the post-communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) 
(see upper part of panel B). In the remaining countries from the “South”, however, 
stemming from Latin America, East, South-East and South Asia, the Middle East and 
scattered parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a critical difference in the makeup of the 
two first dimensions (see upper part of panel C). More specifically, the use of formal 
exams as a mechanism for public sector recruitment is in these parts of the world a 
component of the “professionalism” dimension, leaving lifelong careers and special 
employment laws as the only indicators of closedness. 
 
Here is not the place to determine exactly why this difference in public employment 
structures has emerged. We can only speculate in the possibility that, at the critical stage 
of state-building, competitive exams became the primary mechanism for implementing 
meritocratic recruitment in the developing world. In Europe, by contrast, these exams 
only became the tool for establishing meritocratic recruitment in closed bureaucracies 
formed in the “Napoleonic” tradition, such as France and Spain, whereas other 
mechanisms of meritocratization were implemented in, for example, Britain and 
Scandinavia (Peters and Painter 2010, 20-23). Whatever its origins, this dual nature of 
formal exams raises a problem of measurement equivalence for our efforts to compare 
 18 
bureaucratic structures systematically across the globe. Put simply, what the lower panels 
of Table 2 imply is that professionalism and closedness are not the same “species”, as it 
were, in different parts of the world. This in turns means that we cannot form an 
equivalent measure of the two across all countries.  
 
The lower parts of panels B and C of Table 2 however also suggest a partial solution to 
this measurement problem by indicating that the four core indicators of the 
professionalism dimension, if studied in isolation and most critically without the item on 
formal exams, hold up well across contexts. As a consequence, we may safely compare 
this dimension across countries, although the remaining three indicators of closedness 
(formal exams, lifelong careers and special employment laws) may only be combined 
into a meaningful measure of closedness in the “Western” and “Eastern” sample of 
countries. 
 
Based on these results we thus construct two additive indices, professionalism and 
closedness which link back to the theoretical expectations described in previous sections, 
computed by averaging the respective items to which these dimensions are strongly 
connected, but for the closedness index based on a more limited sample (only “Western” 
and “Eastern” countries). Theoretically these indices may vary from 1 to 7, with 1 
representing completely unprofessionalized or perfectly open systems, and 7 
corresponding to a perfectly professionalized or closed system. The basic descriptive 
information on these two indices, together with the remaining competitive salaries 
indicator, is presented in Table 3. As can be seen, the average bureaucratic system 
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included in this sample is deemed to be slightly more professionalized and, even clearer 
so, more closed than the midpoint (4) of the 1-7 scale. Salaries are however to a lesser 
degree perceived to be competitive in these countries.  
 
*** Table 3 about here *** 
 
As Table 3 also indicates, however, there are large discrepancies around these means, 
both among experts assessing different countries and among those judging the same 
country. These variations are presented in Figure 1-2, which together with the country-
specific means display 95 % confidence intervals that take the underlying within-country 
uncertainty into account.4 
 
*** Figure 1-2 around here *** 
 
In Figure 1 we find most countries belonging to the Anglo-Saxon tradition or strongly 
influenced by that tradition, such as Ireland, New Zealand, Hong Kong and the UK, or to 
the Scandinavian administrative tradition, such as Norway, Denmark and Sweden, at the 
top of the Professionalism continuum, which is not very surprising. However, here we 
also find countries belonging to the East Asian administrative tradition, like Japan and 
Korea, known for having a strong professional bureaucracy. In the middle of the scale  
we find European countries with known high levels of politicization of the civil service, 
such as Spain and Italy (Dahlström 2009; Matheson et al 2007), and close to the bottom, 
several Latin American countries, which according to Peters and Painter (2010, 24) are 
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belonging to an administrative tradition that is “patrimonial at its core”. As the 
confidence intervals indicate, there is of course considerable uncertainty underlying these 
estimates. Of particular concern in this regard are Botswana, Mozambique, Nepal, 
Ecuador and Kyrgyzstan, where the expert respondents are in considerable disagreement 
over the extent to which the public administration in these countries is professionalized. 
The average 95 % confidence interval is however 1.01, almost exactly the magnitude of 
the cross-country standard deviation. The ratio of the between- over the within-country 
variation, moreover, is approximately 1.19 (see Table 3). Despite expert uncertainty, and 
in some cases small country samples, we would thus argue that these data give 
meaningful estimates of the level of professionalization across countries. 
 
Figure 2 captures how “closed” civil service systems are in the limited sample (only 
“Western” and “Eastern” countries), and, again, the ranking seems to correspond with 
established observations in the small-N studies surveyed above. Near the top are Spain 
and France, countries that already in the historical analysis of public administrations in 
the 19th century have been pointed out as the clearest examples of bureaucracies with 
“organizational orientation”, in opposition to the ones with “professional orientation” 
(Silberman 1993). Those countries (together with other such as Greece, Italy or Belgium) 
also rank at the top in more contemporary accounts of closed administrations, both by 
scholars (Peters and Painter 2010) and international organizations (OECD 2004). At the 
bottom of the ranking, we find the countries regarded in those accounts as more “open” 
(or more professional or private-sector oriented), such as New Zealand, Australia, 
Denmark or the Netherlands (OECD 2004). These countries lack the formal examinations 
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more “closed” bureaucracies have (e.g. French concours or Spanish oposiciones) as well 
as their guarantees of lifelong tenure and other civil service protections established in 
special employment laws (Bezes 2010; Lapuente 2007). At the bottom of the bureaucratic 
closedness scale we also see a very different group of countries – such as Belarus, 
Georgia or Russia – that were also at the bottom in terms of bureaucratic professionalism 
given their high levels of politicization and low levels or meritocracy. In other words, 
being at the bottom of this scale, because you have a more open or private-oriented 
approach to public employment, does not lead you to have a less (or more) meritocratic 
bureaucracy.  
 
Again these point estimates are surrounded by perception uncertainty. The average 95 % 
confidence interval is here 1.10, and the between/within-country variation ratio only .84. 
Countries of considerable concern are Uzbekistan, where the uncertainty bounds are so 
wide as to render any meaningful inference almost impossible, but also Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzhtan, Azerbaijan and Austria. Although this warrants caution for potential data 
users, the cross-country patterns are nevertheless sensible enough to suggest that these 
data tap into another structural difference among bureaucratic systems. 
 
The fact that professionalism and closedness are independent dimension is graphically 
summarized in Figure 3, which plots the 47 countries from which we have data on both 
their degree of “professionalism” and “closedness.” Unlike the usual unidimensional 
accounts of bureaucracies (i.e. patronage-based vs. merit-based), we see here how four 
different types of bureaucracies emerge. Among the more “open” (or more “private”), 
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there are both patronage-based (e.g. Moldova, Georgia) as well as the top performers in 
merit (e.g. New Zealand, Denmark). And among the more “closed” or “public” there are 
some relatively meritocratic (e.g. Ireland, Belgium and France), but there are also some 
with relatively high levels of politicization and lack of merit (e.g. Greece, Italy). In other 
words, having a more “public” bureaucratic employment system does not mean having a 
more meritocratic bureaucracy (they correlate at –.05). These findings can have important 
normative implications for policymakers interested in developing more meritocratic 
bureaucracies.   
 
*** Figure 3 around here *** 
 
Cross-source validation 
We now turn to a check of the robustness of the two dimensions just discussed, using 
four different alternative proxies of bureaucratic structure from various sources. These 
tests are reported in Table 4. The first source of validation is an expert survey on the 
number of politically appointed officials in the central government offices from 18 
countries conducted by Dahlström (2011). Between two and four highly qualified country 
experts, all of whom were identified on the basis of their publication record in public 
administration, were asked to provide an estimate of this number. This survey is thus 
similar to ours in terms of the sample of experts (although the sample size per country is 
more narrow), but instead of using a subjectively defined response scale, exact, and thus 
more objective statements of facts, were solicited. We have taken the log of this figure to 
smooth out country outliers, the expectation of course being that more professionalized 
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systems should have fewer political appointees. The degree to which a bureaucratic 
system is open or closed, on the other hand, is not expected to be correlated with this 
number.  
 
*** Table 4 about here *** 
 
The second source reported in Table 4 is the scale of “Bureaucracy quality”, ranging 
from 1 to 4, as reported by the Political Risk Services group’s “International Credit Risk 
guide” in 2008, the latest year available. The ICRG staff produces a subjective 
assessment based on available political information from 143 countries in the world, 87 
of which overlap with our country sample.5 We expect also this assessment to be 
correlated with the professionalism index, but not with bureaucratic closedness. 
 
The third and fourth sources have been selected to correspond to the closedness 
dimension. Data for both have been collected by the OECD through a survey filled in by 
senior officials from ministries/agencies for public employment/management of the civil 
service. The underlying data are thus again subjective perceptions, but now from the 
viewpoint of civil servants themselves rather than from outside experts. The first is the 
“Index of Recruitment Systems”, which theoretically varies from 0 (“Career-based 
system”, i.e., “closed”) to 1 (“Position-based system”, i.e., “open”). This index is 
constructed from four questions, two of which tap in to the use of competitive 
examinations vs. direct applications in the recruitment process, and one of which 
concerns the extent to which positions in the civil service are open to external recruitment 
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or not. These features closely correspond to our theoretical distinction between open and 
closed bureaucracies (OECD 2009). 
 
The fourth (and second OECD) source is a measure of the “degree of individualization”, 
which denotes “the degree to which the management rules and practices vary according 
to the individuals and less according to the group” (OECD 2004, 17). In those systems 
defined as closed, public, organizationally-oriented or career-based, candidates join the 
civil service in relatively large-scale job competitions, their salaries and employment 
conditions are collectively bargained and their promotions collectively regulated and 
granted. In simple words, civil servants are, first and foremost, treated as members of a 
collective. On the contrary, in those systems known as open, private, professionally-
oriented or position-based, candidates (like their private sector counterparts) are recruited 
to fill a particular position, and their salaries and employment conditions are more likely 
to be set on an individual basis. Thus, this is a measure we expect to be associated with 
the closedness of a bureaucracy, not to its degree of professionalism. 
 
As Table 4 makes clear, these expectations are well borne out. Among the 18 countries 
for which there are overlapping observations, the professionalism index is negatively 
correlated with the number of appointees (at –.67), whereas the association with the 
closedness index at .42 is only marginally significant. Moreover, ICRG:s “bureaucracy 
quality” is reasonably well correlated with professionalism (at .70), but completely 
unrelated to closedness. By contrast, the two OECD indices are most closely related to 
 25 
closedness (with correlations at –.66 and –.55), but their relationships with 
professionalism are weak and not statistically significant. 
 
Equally reassuring are the results from correlating selected indicators in our data with 
those obtained by Rauch & Evans (2000) for 27 overlapping countries. Their “merit” 
indicator, which is a composite but mostly should tap into the use of formal examination 
systems, correlates at .83 with our corresponding formal exams indicator (q2_c), and at 
.64 with our more general item on meritocratic recruitment (q2_a). Their gauge of “career 
stability”, moreover, correlates at .74 with out measure of internal promotion (q2_e), and 
at .72 with that of lifelong careers (q2_f). Finally, our measure of competitive salaries 
correlates at .46 with Rauch & Evans (2000) corresponding indicator. (See Appendix A 
for our items.) 
 
Assessing Respondent Perception Bias 
The expert respondents taking part in our survey of course differ from each other. The 
average respondent in our more restricted sample of 97 countries with at least 3 
respondents is a male (71 %), 48 years old PhD (72 %), an overwhelming majority of 
which were either born (89 %) or live (93 %) in the country for which they have provided 
their responses. From the second wave of data collection, when a question on 
employment was first introduced, we also know that 56 percent of the respondents are 
university academics, 14 percent work for an NGO or non-profit organization, and 15 
percent are employed by the very government they are being asked to assess. Do these 
expert characteristics somehow affect perceptions of bureaucratic structures? If 
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perceptions vary systematically by observable expert characteristics, the extent to which 
they reflect a common underlying reality would be in doubt. That would for example 
imply that the estimate for a particular country is determined by the make-up of the 
sample of experts rather than by its bureaucratic structure or practices. 
 
To assess the risk of such perception bias, we have in Table 5 regressed the two 
dimensions of bureaucracy on all six expert characteristics for which we have data. Table 
5 contains three columns. The first column reports results from both waves for the 
professionalism dimension (97 countries), while the second reports the results for the 
professionalism dimension only using the second wave (53 countries). The reason for 
including the second column is that we can only analyze the effect of employment in the 
second wave. In the third column we report results for the closedness dimension, using 
information on “Western” and “Eastern” countries from both waves (47 countries).  
 
In order to assess differences in perceptions across different types of experts while 
holding the object of evaluation (i.e. the bureaucracy of a specific country) constant, 
these estimates exclusively rely on the within-country variation among experts (in 
technical terms, we control for country-fixed effects). With this control in place, as can 
be seen, there are no gender or age differences in the estimates of professionalism or 
closedness, nor does country of birth matter. However, a systematic tendency that does 
appear is that respondents assessing countries in which they do not live perceive 
bureaucracies to be less professionalized and more open (as compared to experts living in 
the country they assess). Thus, once cross-country variation is being controlled for, 
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respondents not living in the country they assess rate the bureaucracies .362 points lower 
than resident respondents on the 1–7 professionalism scale, and .384 lower on the 1–7 
closedness index. There is also a hardly surprising tendency of about the same magnitude 
that government employees assess their bureaucratic structures as more professionalized 
than non-government employees. Finally, respondents having achieved a higher level of 
education (in effect PhDs) perceive bureaucracies as somewhat less professionalized. 
 
*** Table 5 about here *** 
 
Although we must acknowledge that these systematic differences appear in the data, they 
are at the same time not very large in absolute terms. When it comes to relative 
differences in country scores, moreover, the results we obtain are extremely robust to 
these controls for expert characteristics (average country scores with and without controls 
correlate at .99). By and large then, whereas these sources of perception bias introduce 
some extra noise in our data, they are not serious enough to question the overall validity 
of the dimensions of bureaucracy. 
 
Conclusions 
The field of comparative public administration lacks broad comparative data on many of 
its key variables which, of course, hampers empirical analyses. This chapter has 
presented a unique attempt to provide such data on several relevant administrative 
features for a large number of countries. This data is publically available at Quality of 
Government Institute web page (www.qog.pol.gu.se) and will in the future hopefully help 
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to explain differences in bureaucratic performance, state capacity and social outcomes 
such as corruption and economic growth.  
 
The chapter makes both a theoretical and an empirical contribution. Drawing on the work 
of administrative historians, we argue that already on theoretical grounds one should 
expect several dimensions in a Weberian bureaucracy. While acknowledging that there 
are several other characteristics of an ideal type Weberian bureaucracy not measured by 
our data (such as the bureau organization, the hierarchical organization, and the rule-
based authority), we suggest two dimensions based on the recruitment and career systems 
in the bureaucracy. In this chapter we refer to the two dimensions as bureaucratic 
professionalism (i.e. up to which extent bureaucracies are “professional” vis-à-vis 
“politicized”) and bureaucratic closedness (i.e. up to which extent bureaucracies are more 
“closed” or public-like vis-à-vis “open” or private-like). 
 
The main contribution of the chapter is however empirical and we demonstrate that the 
recruitment and career features of the bureaucracy follow the two dimensions in Western 
democracies and post-communist countries. By contrast, in other parts of the World, such 
as Latin America, Asia and Africa, only the professionalism dimension is applicable. 
These findings are interesting for at least two reasons. First, it demonstrates that analytic 
dimensions based on the European experience of administrative history can not be 
assumed to work in developing countries without empirical scrutiny. Second, it also 
shows that while some bureaucratic features do not cluster together to meaningful 
dimensions for all parts of the World, others actually do. Maybe the most important 
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finding in the chapter is that the professionalism dimension actually allows meaningful 
comparison of public administrations across different contexts. Finally, by way of 
validating the two dimensions against other independent data sources and demonstrating 
that the results have not been produced by respondent perception bias the chapter secures 
data quality and points to the significance of the results. 
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Table 1. Number of Valid Responses by Country 
Country   n Country n Country n 
Albania 11 Guatemala  18 Panama   2 
Algeria   3 Guinea   1 Paraguay   6 
Argentina 17 Guyana   1 Peru   9 
Armenia 16 Honduras   3 Philippines 15 
Australia 11 Hong Kong 12 Poland 11 
Austria   5 Hungary 15 Portugal   9 
Azerbaijan   6 Iceland   4 Puerto Rico   6 
Bahamas   1 India 15 Romania 17 
Bangladesh   6 Indonesia 19 Russia    6 
Barbados   1 Ireland 16 Rwanda   1 
Belarus   9 Israel 15 Saudi Arabia   4 
Belgium   9 Italy   7 Serbia   3 
Bolivia   9 Jamaica   9 Seychelles   1 
Bosnia    7 Japan   9 Sierra Leone   1 
Botswana   3 Jordan   4 Singapore   1 
Brazil   8 Kazakhstan   7 Slovakia   7 
Bulgaria 22 South Korea 15 Slovenia 11 
Burkina Faso   1 Kuwait   2 South Africa   9 
Cameroon   2 Kyrgyzstan   6 Spain   7 
Canada 18 Latvia   7 Sri Lanka   8 
Chile 17 Lebanon   3 St Lucia   1 
China   4 Lesotho   1 Sudan   2 
Colombia 15 Lithuania 11 Suriname   3 
Costa Rica 14 Luxembourg   1 Sweden 10 
Croatia   6 Macedonia   7 Switzerland   5 
Cuba   1 Malawi   3 Taiwan   3 
Cyprus   2 Malaysia   8 Tanzania   1 
Czech Republic 28 Malta   4 Thailand 10 
Denmark 13 Mauritania   3 Timor-Leste   1 
Dominican Rep.   5 Mauritius   2 Trinidad & Tob.   1 
Ecuador   5 Mexico 11 Tunisia   1 
Egypt   3 Moldova   3 Turkey 20 
El Salvador 11 Mongolia   2 Uganda   2 
Estonia 10 Morocco   3 Ukraine 11 
Ethiopia   1 Mozambique   3 United Arab Em.   4 
Finland 11 Nepal   5 United Kingdom 12 
France 6 Netherlands 14 United States 19 
Gabon   1 New Zealand 12 Uruguay 10 
Georgia   8 Nicaragua 17 Uzbekistan   3 
Germany 12 Nigeria   5 Venezuela 22 
Ghana   1 Norway 12 Vietnam 15 
Greece 22 Pakistan   3 Zimbabwe   1 
    TOTAL 973 
Note: Countries in italics are not included in this chapter due to too low response rate. 
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Table 2. Dimensions of Bureaucracy. 
 Professionalism Closedness Salaries 
A. GLOBALLY (n=97) 
 
  
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a) 
  .91   .08   .07 
Political recruitment (q2_b) –.88 –.03 –.15 
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d) –.80 –.08   .09 
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e) 
  .70   .43 –.10 
Formal examination system (q2_c)   .34 
  .74 –.06 
Lifelong careers (q2_f)   .28 
  .78 –.24 
Special employment laws (q8_f) –.24 
  .78 –.03 
Competitive salaries (q2_k)   .07 –.09 
    .97 
    
B. EAST & WEST (n=47) 
 
  
   Multidimensional: 
 
  
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a) 
  .91 –.15 –.01 
Political recruitment (q2_b) –.93   .14 –.09 
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d) –.85 –.13 –.09 
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e) 
  .82   .25 –.08 
Formal examination system (q2_c) –.08 
  .86   .08 
Lifelong careers (q2_f)   .23 
  .76 –.30 
Special employment laws (q8_f) –.37 
  .59 –.20 
Competitive salaries (q2_k)   .05 –.07 
  .97 
   Unidimensional: 
 
  
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a) 
  .93 — — 
Political recruitment (q2_b) –.94 — — 
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d) –.85 — — 
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e) 
  .80 — — 
    
C. SOUTH (n=50) 
 
  
   Multidimensional: 
 
  
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a) 
  .89   .22   .10 
Political recruitment (q2_b) –.78 –.20 –.30 
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d) –.79   .05   .15 
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e) 
  .64   .45 –.27 
Formal examination system (q2_c)   .81   .36 –.17 
Lifelong careers (q2_f)   .43 
  .75 –.25 
Special employment laws (q8_f)   .08 
  .87   .11 
Competitive salaries (q2_k)   .01 –.04 
  .92 
   Unidimensional: 
 
  
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a) 
  .92 — — 
Political recruitment (q2_b) –.82 — — 
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d) –.78 — — 
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e) 
  .72 — — 
Note: Entries are varimax rotated factor loadings retained from principal components 
factor analyses at the country level. Loadings >.5 or <–.5 are highlighted in bold, 
questionnaire items (see the Appendix) within parentheses. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Characteristics of Three Dimensions of Bureaucracy. 
  
Country–
level mean 
Cross–
country 
standard 
deviation 
Within–
country 
standard 
deviation 
Ratio 
 cross– over 
within 
variation  
 
 
 
N (n) 
Professionalism 3.92 .99 .83 1.19 97 (936) 
      
Closedness 4.92 .74 .87 .84 47 (486) 
      
Salaries 3.21 1.02 1.42 .72 97 (910) 
      
Note: Each dimension may theoretically vary from 1 to 7. The within–country standard 
deviation is based on n individual–level respondents, the country–level means and cross–
country standard deviations are based on N countries. 
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Table 4. Tests of Cross–Source Validity. 
 Professionalism Closedness 
Log of no. of political appointees   –.67*** .42* 
 (18) (18) 
Bureaucracy quality (ICRG)   .70*** .03 
 (87) (41) 
Index of recruitment system (OECD)  .08   –.66*** 
 (25) (21) 
Degree of individualization (OECD) .31   –.55*** 
 (28) (25) 
* significant at the .10–level, ** significant at the .05–level, *** significant at the .01–level.  
Note: Entries are correlation coefficients, with number of countries within parentheses. 
 
 
 41 
Table 5. Respondent Perception Bias. 
 Professionalism Professionalism Closedness 
Female –.033 –.019 –.137 
 (.072) (.118) (.104) 
PhD –.164** –.105 .018 
 (.081) (.120) (.130) 
Year of birth –.000 .000 .005 
 (.003) (.004) (.004) 
Was not born in country –.061 –.030 .115 
 (.102) (.153) (.161) 
Does not live in country –.362*** –.283 –.384** 
 (.123) (.194) (.191) 
Government employee in country  .350**  
  (.159) 
 
 
Number of respondents (n) 874 370 457 
Number of countries (N)   97   53   47 
* significant at the .10–level, ** significant at the .05–level, *** significant at the .01–level.  
Note: Entries are country–fixed effects regression coefficients with standard errors within 
parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Bureaucratic Professionalism (country means with 95 % confidence intervals) 
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Figure 2. Bureaucratic Closedness (country means with 95 % confidence intervals) 
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Figure 3. Bureaucratic professionalism and bureaucratic closedness. 
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Appendix A: Extract from the QoG-survey questionnaire 
 
q2. Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following 
occurs today? [Response scale from 1.“Hardly ever” to 7.“Almost always”] 
a. When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide 
who gets the job? 
b. When recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of the applicants 
decide who gets the job? 
c. Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system? 
d. The top political leadership hires and fires senior public officials? 
e. Senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector? 
f. Once one is recruited as a public sector employee, one stays a public sector employee 
for the rest of one’s career? 
g. Firms that provide the most favorable kickbacks to senior officials are awarded public 
procurement contracts in favor of firms making the lowest bid? 
h. When deciding how to implement policies in individual cases, public sector 
employees treat some groups in society unfairly? 
j. When granting licenses to start up private firms, public sector employees favor 
applicants with which they have strong personal contacts? 
k. Senior officials have salaries that are comparable with the salaries of private sector 
managers with roughly similar training and responsibilities? 
l. The salaries of public sector employees are linked to appraisals of their performance? 
m. When found guilty of misconduct, public sector employees are reprimanded by proper 
bureaucratic mechanisms? 
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q8. To what extent would you say the following applies today to the country you have 
chosen to submit your answers for? [Response scale from 1.“Not at all” to 7.“To a very 
large extent”] 
a. Public sector employees strive to be efficient? 
b. Public sector employees strive to implement the policies decided upon by the top 
political leadership? 
c. Public sector employees strive to help clients? 
d. Public sector employees strive to follow rules? 
e. Public sector employees strive to fulfil the ideology of the party/parties in 
government? 
f. The terms of employment for public sector employees are regulated by special laws 
that do not apply to private sector employees? 
g. The provision of public services is subject to competition from private sector 
companies, NGOs or other public agencies? 
h. The provision of public services is funded by user fees and/or private insurances rather 
than taxes? 
i.  Women are proportionally represented among public sector employees? 
j.  Key ethnic and religious groups in society are proportionally represented among public 
sector employees?* 
k. Public sector employees risk severe negative consequences if they pass on information 
about abuses of public power to the media?* 
l. Government documents and records are open to public access?* 
m. Abuses of power within the public sector are likely to be exposed in the media?* 
 
* Note: Questions q8_j, q8_k, q8_l, and q8_m were only included in the second wave 
(2010). Neither of these questions are however analysed in this chapter.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 It should, however, already at this point be noted that we do not claim that these two dimensions are the 
only important characteristics of a Weberian bureaucracy. We are aware of that we are leaving features 
such as the bureau organization, the hierarchical organization, and the rule–based authority, aside and 
concentrating our efforts on recruitment and career systems. 
2
 The average response time was around 15 minutes when correcting for extreme outliers in the first wave, 
and 18 minutes in the second. We contacted these persons by email, including a clickable link inside the 
email leading to the web–based questionnaire. In the first wave, only an English–language questionnaire 
was provided, whereas respondents in the second were also offered the questionnaire in Spanish and 
French. The only incentives presented to participants were access to the data, a first–hand report, and the 
possibility of being invited to future conferences. 
3
 Although these regional level analyses signify an important move down the ladder of generality, it would 
of course have been ideal to pin down the dimensional structure on a country–by–country basis. However, 
the very small sample sizes within countries do not allow that option. 
4
 Since the average sample size per country is slightly less than 10 respondents, non–parametric 
bootstrapped confidence intervals are deemed more accurate than parametric ones based on the normality 
assumption. Bias–corrected 95 percent confidence intervals with 1000 replications on a country–by–
country basis have been estimated in Stata 11.0 
5
 ICRG,  “Interbnational Country Risk Guide Methodology“. The PRS Group. Available online at: 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx, p.7. 
